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NEW CLASSICAL MONETARY BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY 
by Rudy van Zijp 
1. INTRODUCTTON 
In the last two decades business cycle theory has been experiencing a remarkable survival. 
Whereas it seemed as if it had disappeared from the economists' research agenda in the 1960S,1 
it reemerged when New Classical Economies came up with a new explanation of the phenomena 
under consideration. Although their views on monetary policy evoked much criticism, since the 
second half of the 1970s New Classicism has nevertheless assumed a prominent place in the 
profession. 
The purpose of this paper is to outline New Classical business cycle theory and to 
analyze its concepts and assumptions. The analysis will be limited to the monetary version of the 
theory. As New Classicism builds on some aspects of Monetarism, it is obvious that our analysis 
will start with the latter. Nevertheless, New Classicism did not copy the Monetarist concepts 
without some modifications. In particular, it specified a different (outcome of the) expectations 
formation process. This turned out to have some far-reaching implications for the information 
sets of individuals. It also had drastic implications for the feasibility of monetary policy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 expounds some hypotheses used by the 
Monetarists. These provide a link with New Classical Economies. In section 3 the basic 
assumptions of the latter are described. It tums out that the assumptions concerning the 
information individuals are presumed to have play a crucial role. Therefore, section 4 addresses 
the issue of these so-called 'information sets'. It also comprises the New Classical method of 
solving the problem how to model decentralized market economies, emphasizing the New 
Classical equilibrium concept, the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). The solution to the 
problem will prove to be in contradiction with the New Classical tenet of methodological 
individualism. Furthermore, the informational assumptions play a crucial role in their theory of 
business cycles. The monetary version of this theory will be analyzed in section 5. 
1
 Cf. Bronfenbrenner (ed.) (1969). 
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2. MONETARIST ROOTS: THE PHILLIPS CURVE AND THE 
NATURAL RATE HYPOTHESIS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Considering its Monetarist roots, it seems appropriate to start any analysis of New Classicism 
with a study of Monetarism, and in particular with the Monetarist equilibrium concept. 
Furthermore, as the Monetarists stressed the importance of individuals' expectations formation 
processes, some attention must be devoted to this issue. 
Monetarism builds on the work of M. Friedman, E.S. Phelps, K. Brunner, A.H. 
Meltzer, L.C. Andersen and J.L. Jordan. In particular Friedman and Phelps played a major role 
in what now may be called the 'retreat' of Keynesianism during the 1970s and 1980s. By 
incorporating the Phillips Curve in their analysis they robbed Keynesianism of its justification for 
stabilisation policy. They argued that Phillips' tradeoff between unemployment and inflation was 
merely a temporary one, as in their view the Phillips Curve was a short-run phenomenon, 
subordinated to the long-run 'Natural Rate'-equilibrium. 
This section will concentrate on certain features of Monetarist analysis. These are (1) 
the treatment of the Phillips Curve as a short-run curve, and of the Natural Rate Hypothesis as 
implying a vertical long-run Phillips Curve; and (2) the incorporation of the Adaptive Expecta-
tions Hypothesis. Both issues will be addressed in this order. 
2.2. THE PHILLIPS CURVE 
In 1958 A.W. Phillips hypothesized that the tighter the labour market, the more rapidly 
employers had to increase nominal wages in order to attract new employees and retain the ones 
they already employed. This led him to study "... the hypothesis that the rate of change of 
money wage rates in the United Kingdom can be explained by the level of unemployment and 
the rate of change of unemployment ..." (Phillips (1958, p. 284)). As he presupposed the exis-
tence of downward wage rigidity, Phillips (1958, p. 283) assumed a nonlinear relationship 
between the variables mentioned. He discovered that his empirical data supported the hypothesis 
and that the (hyperbolical) relationship was remarkably stable over the period analyzed. The 
relationship was later called the Phillips curve.2 It represents stable (constant) combinations of 
The Phillips curve may be represented mathematically as: 
dW = W(dU, U), d(dW)/dU>0, d(dW)/d(dU) <0, 
with dW = change in nominal wage rate, 
U = unemployment rate, and 
dU = change in unemployment rate. 
Cf. Visser (1980, p. 330). 
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the rate of unemployment and the change in nomina! wage rate.3 
Unfortunately (according to at least some economists) the Phillips curve seemed to 
lack a theoretical foundation. It was regarded as merely reflecting an empirical relationship, for 
which no theory was designed as yet. Moreover, it suggested that the level of employment 
depended on the rate of change in the nominal wage rate. This implies money illusion on the 
part of the economie agents, which does not accord with the neoclassical rationality postulate. 
Despite Phillips' averaging out all cyclical influences, Samuelson and Solow (1960) 
interpreted the Phillips curve as a short-run relationship.4 Moreover, they substituted the rate of 
change in the nominal wage rate by the rate of change in prices, implying that prices and 
nominal wages are very closely connected (p. 192)). However, they explititly warned that "[i]t 
would be wrong, though, to think that our Figure 2 menu [cf. p. 192] that relates obtainable 
price and unemployment behavior will maintain its shape in the longer run. What we do in a 
policy way during the next few years might cause it to shift in a definite way" (p. 193). They 
even mentioned the possibility of moving the Phillips curve to the left by institutional reforms. It 
seems that Samuelson's and Solow's warning was forgotten when theirs became the Standard 
interpretation of the Phillips curve. This interpretation holds that an exploitable tradeoff between 
the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment exists. Governments are faced with "... a 
menu of choices" (Hoover (1988, p. 24)). According to this view policymakers are able to set a 
combination of inflation and unemployment which they regard as desirable. It was thought that 
this could be done without any repercussions in the longer run. This led to the incorporation of 
the Phillips curve into macroeconometric models during the 1960s and 1970s. The curve was 
widely used in the analysis of government macroeconomic policy (Hoover (1988, p. 24)). 
However, by the end of the 1960s serious doubts were raised against its usefulness for these 
tasks. 
3
 According to Desai (1975, p. 2, italics in original) "... much of the work done since Phillips' 
paper lias been based on a misunderstanding of the original relationship' He regards the Phillips 
curve as a long-run relationship between the level of the unemployment rate and the change in 
nominal wage rates. In nis view, the distinction between a short-run and a long-run curve is 
quite "unnecessary and erroneous". 
4
 Samuelson's and Solow's (1960, p. 193) analysis "... has been phrased in short-run terms, 
dealing with what will happen in the next few years." 
5
 Hoover (1988) seems to imply that the Samuelson-Solow interpretation of the Phillips 
curve became the Standard interpretation. However, as their warning with regard to the policy to 
be conducted shows, both economists were aware of the possibility of a shifting curve, thereby 
implying that the curve is policy-dependent. It seems more correct to conclude that the Standard 
interpretation, as sketched by Hoover, is a rather simplistic version of the Samuelson-Solow 
interpretation. 
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2.3. FRffiDMAN'S BENCHMARK: THE NATURAL RATE HYPOTHESIS 
In his presidential address to the American Economie Association Milton Friedman (1968) 
opined that the tradeoff was not exploitable in the long run. He argued that rational individuals 
do not suffer from money illusion. They will take the price level and the rate of inflation into 
account when negotiating future wages, and base their actions upon the real wage rate. In 
Friedman's (1968, p. 8, italics in original) opinion Phillips' analysis "... contains a basic defect -
the failure to distinguish between nominal wages and real wages ,.."6 Friedman raised another 
criticism against Phillips' analysis. He accused him (impUcitly) of confusing the rate of unemploy-
ment with the changes in this rate.7 According to Hoover (1988, pp. 24 - 25, italics in original), 
Friedman argued that "... the PhiUips curve should relate the rate of unemployment to changes 
in the real not the nominal wage rate, and ... the long-run relationship should be between the 
level of the wage rate and the rate of unemployment and not between changes in the wage rate 
and the rate of unemployment." Analogous to Wicksell's 'natural' rate of interest, Friedman calls 
this long-run relationship the natural rate of unemployment (NRU). The NRU reflects the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment to which a stable economy tends, once disruptive influences 
are removed (Hoover (1988, p. 25)). In this situation no tradeoff exists between the rate of 
unemployment and the change in nominal wage rate. The long-run Phillips curve is then a 
As Hoover argues, Friedman should not have directed his critiósms at Phillips' analysis, 
but rather at the Standard interpretation of the Phillips curve, i.e., the simplified version of 
Samuelson and Solow's interpretation of the curve. Cf. Hoover (1988, p. 260, note 6). 
7
 Friedman (1968, p. 8) relates the level of unemployment to the level of real wages. 
8
 It should be noted that Friedman's analogy does not apply completely. After all, whereas 
the NRU may be seen as the long run (genera!) equilibrium level of unemployment, Wicksell's 
'natural' rate of interest refers merely to monetary equilibrium. Both equilibria need not 
coincide: monetary equilibrium does not imply general equilibrium. (I owe this point to Mr. 
Botha from the Centre of Economie Analysis in Pretoria, South Africa). 
9
 Friedman (1968, p. 8) defines the natural rate of unemployment as "... the level that 
would be ground out by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there 
is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, 
including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the cost of 
gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the cost of mobility, and so 
on." In other words, the NRU gives the level of frictional unemployment in a perfect-competitive 
market. It is not a fixed level. As Phelps (1968, p. 678n) casually remarks in a footnote, "[a] 
monetary economy can choose among different levels of frictional unemployment that cor-
responds to different levels of aggregate demand and job vacancies. In fact, therefore, there is 
no unique full-employment quantity of frictional unemployment." Unfortunately, Phelps does not 
elaborate on this, so it remains unclear how he thought this choice can be made. The fact that 
the NRU need not be a stable rate of unemployment may also be analyzed in terms of 
hysteresis. Hysteresis is the situation in which the equilibrium value of a variable depends on its 
value in the past. For instance, a random shock may cause mass unemployment. In turn, this 
unemployment may lead to a rise in the natural rate of unemployment because (employers think 
that) the human capital of the unemployed in the form skills and motivation deteriorates. For a 
detailed treatment of hysteresis, see Cross (ed.) (1988). 
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vertical line at the equilibrium (or NRU) level.10 This implies that monetary policy in the long 
run merely raises the rate of inflation but does not lower the rate of unemployment. This leads 
Friedman (1968, p. 13) to conclude that such policy should be limited to providing a stable 
background for the economy. And this objective is best achieved by a steady rate of growth of 
the money supply (Friedman (1968, p. 16)). The hypothesis concerning the (long-run) attainment 
of a situation in which a natural rate of unemployment prevails is called the Natural Rate 
Hypothesis (NRH). 
2.4. THE ADAPTTVE EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
Friedman substituted the nominal wage rate by the real wage rate, because in his view in-
dividuals take account of the rate of inflation in forming their expectations about their future 
wage rate. This means that Friedman should have incorporated an expectations formation 
process into the Phillips curve. However, this incorporation is due mainly to the work of Phelps 
(1967), leading to the so-called expectations-augmented Phillips curve. Phelps' conclusions were 
rather similar to those of Friedman, although the emphases of their arguments differ consider-
ably. Whereas Friedman stressed the macroeconomic concept of the NRU, Phelps tried to 
establish the microeconomics of labour markets. He studied the problem how these markets 
operate when information is incomplete and costly. 
Individuals do not suffer from money illusion in the case of the NRU. Given perfect 
information, this means that they correctly distinguish nominal from real shocks. A necessary 
condition for such correct interpretation of shocks is that individuals must possess complete 
information. Thus, a defining characteristic of Friedman's NRU is the complete information set 
of the individuals. As both Friedman and Phelps assumed that information is complete in the 
long run, the NRU is attained only in the long run. Put another way, the NRU can best be seen 
as a benchmark, a Standard against which the actual performance of an economy can be 
judged.11 In contrast, the short-run analysis reveals a quite different picture because then it 
cannot be maintained that individuals base their expectations and decisions on full information. 
The analytical problem then is how to model their expectations formation process and the 
incomplete information used in it. Phelps (1967) solved this problem by assuming that each 
1U
 Hoover (1988, p. 25) states that "[i]f the PhiUips curve were plotted with the rate of 
change of nominal wages on the vertical axes and the rate of unemployment on the horizontal 
axis, then economie theory demands ... that it be a vertical line at the equilibrium or natural rate 
of unemployment" (italics in original). 
11
 Phelps (1968 (1970), p. 124 - 25) argues that "... any actual economy is almost continu-
ously out of equilibrium, so we need also to study wage and price dynamics under arbitrary 
conditions." He continues by claiming that "[t]he Phillips curve studies of the past decade have 
done this ..." Thus, the Phillips curve is seen as a disequilibrium phenomenon, while Phillips 
himself presumably would have argued that it represents long-run stable combinatiöns of the 
nominal wage rate change and the unemployment rate. 
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individual lives on an 'island', about which he possesses all current infonnation. He assumed that 
infonnation about the wages offered on other islands travels slowly. These assumptions amount 
to an infonnation set of the individual in which all cinrent local infonnation is included but 
which contains only lagged (and therefore incomplete) global infonnation. The absence of money 
illusion implies that the individuals form expectations about real variables. In this 'island' parable 
individuals must do so with incomplete short-run global infonnation. In the case of a change in 
their local nominal wages they are faced with an interpretation problem, namely whether this 
change should be attributed to a change in their real wage or to a change in the genera! price 
level. The incomplete infonnation on which their expectations are based, will lead some (or 
many) individuals to form incorrect estimates of the rate of inflation. This means that they will 
respond to nominal changes as if they were real in nature. It may seem that they suffer from 
money illusion, whereas in fact they merely interpret the change in nominal wage wrongly 
because of insufficiënt infonnation. This insufficiency then explains the relationship between the 
level of unemployment and changes in the nominal wage rate, that is, the negatively sloped 
Phillips curve. 
Phelps used a rather specific expectations formation process, namely the Adaptive 
Expectations Hypothesis (AEH) as used by Koyk (1954) and Cagan (1956). This hypothesis 
states that expectations are weighted averages of the past values of the variable in question. 
These are known and observable, which is of course quite an advantage for a hypothesis on 
expectations formation. However, some problems remain.13 Firstly, the AEH does not explain 
the magnitude of the adjustment parameter Q by an economie theory. It implies that higher 
inflation is only gradually fed into the past data which is used in forming expectations. This 
means that the AEH allows for systematic expectational errors, which economie agents would 
fairly easily correct. It may, therefore, not be consistent with the rationality postulate. Secondly, 
Mathematically this may be expressed as (Begg, 1982, p. 23): 
Er(t) - Ex(t-l) = a fc(t-l) - Ex(t-l)] 
with x(t) = the value of variable x at time t, 
Er(t) = the individual's expectation of variable x(t) formed at time t-1, and 
0<a<l . 
Individuals revise their expectation of x at time t by some fraction of the forecast enor of their 
expectation of x at time t-1. The same expression must hold during the previous periods. By 
recursively substituting the unobservable left hand side by the observable right hand side of the 
equation, the expectation Ex(t) might be written as 
Ex(t) = a *(t-l) + a(l-a) x(t-2) + a(l-a)2 *(t-3) + ... + 
+ a( l -a) n x(t-n-l) + ( l -a) n + 1 Er(t-n-l) 
When time increases, the latter term approaches to zero because 0<a< l . Er(t) is then 
constituted by observable tenns and is therefore itself observable; cf. Begg (1982, p. 23). 
13
 The problems mentioned here have been discussed more extensively by Begg (1982, p. 25 
- 26) and Pesaran (1989, pp. 17 - 19). 
14
 Frank Hahn (1986, p. 281) has pointed out that the fact that "... an agent will not persist 
in expectations which are systematically disappointed ..." does not lead logically validly to the 
conclusion that "... agents have expectations which are not systematically disappointed ..." 
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the AEH is entirely backward-looking. Expectations are formed by using only the past values of 
the variable under consideration. However, it is highly implausible and presumably not even 
rational that other information is excluded. 
In order to overcome these problems theorists have sought a substitute, which they 
found in Muth's (1961) 'Rationa! Expectations Hypothesis' (REH). This hypothesis played a 
significant part in the emergence of the New Classical Economics. 
3. NEW CLASSICAL ECONOMICS: BASIC ASSUMPTTONS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1970s a new school of thought appeared in the economie profession, the New Classical 
Economics (NCE). This school centered around economists like Robert E. Lucas, Thomas J. 
Sargent, Robert J. Barro, Neil Wallace, Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott.16 It holds that 
every individual is a successful and consistent optimizer, given his information set. In this sense 
the individuals are assumed to be always in equilibrium. This implies that they do not suffer 
from money illusion. Only real factors will influence their real economie decisions (Hoover 
(1988, pp. 13 - 14)). It is in this sense that New Classicism is 'classical'. 
The NCE faced severe criticism. Obviously, the assumption concerning man's 
rationality could not have raised the various objections against NCE, as 'mainstream economics' 
is based upon the same fundamental postulate. There must be some other properties which are 
controversial. The basic New Classical assumptions are: 
1) the assumption of continuous market clearing; 
2) the Lucas supply function; 
3) some version of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis; 
4) some version of the NRH; and 
17 
5) some assumption about the information set of the individuals. 
These assumptions are not newly introduced by the NCE (with the exception of the Lucas 
supply function). It is rather their combination which constitutes the 'new5 element in New 
Classicism. As the NRH was already discussed in the previous section, we shall restrict our 
analysis to the other four assumptions. 
15
 Pesaran (1989, Ch. 9) extends the AEH by taking account of information on other 
variables than the one to be predicted. 
16
 Cf. Begg (1982), Shreffm (1983) and Backhouse (1987). 
17
 Cf. Barro (1981), p. 41. 
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3.2. CONT1NUOUS MARKET CLEARING 
One of the defining characteristics of the Rationa! Expectations Equilibrium (REE) is the 
assumption that markets continuously clear. Nominal wages and prices are perfectly flexible, 
equating demand and supply instantaneously. New Classical analysis thus leaves no room for 
involuntary unemployment. This may seem to contradict factual evidence. As (New-)Keynesians 
argue, nominal wages and prices are not perfectly flexible. Rather, they exhibit downward 
rigidity. Therefore they argue that one should assume such rigidity in order to make models 
more realistic. For instance Okun (1981, Chapter 4) has shown that, without full information, it 
may be rational not to let markets clear, by distinguishing between auction markets and search 
or customer markets. The former exhibit continuous market clearing, while the latter are 
characterized by rigid prices. This rigidity is explained by an implicit contract between buyer and 
seller. It states that the buyer remains true to nis seller and that he is rewarded for his loyalty 
by prices that are kept relatively stable. Another (New-)Keynesian explanation of nominal wage 
rigidities refers to incomplete information. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987, pp. 123 - 25) refer to 
the incomplete information that employers have with regard to prospective employees, together 
with the costs of hiring and training new personnel. It may then be advantageous to pay 
relatively high efficiency wages as payment for the relatively higher labour productivity of the 
existing labour force, even if outsiders are willing to work at a lower wage. Hahn (1980, p. 288) 
had already pointed out that employees may also contribute to nominal wage rigidities because 
searching for other jobs may be costly. New Classicals oppose these explanations vehemently. 
Lucas and Sargent (1978, p. 305) argue that "... Keynes took as an unexamined postulate that 
money wages are sticky, meaning that they are set at a level or by a process that could be taken 
as uninfluenced by the macroeconomic forces he proposed to analyze." Lucas (1988, pp. 93 - 95, 
italics in original) argues that "[t]he idea that the theory of contracts will provide a new rationale 
for nominal price rigidities ... is similar to the older idea that monopolistic elements can play the 
same theoretical role. The underlying idea is the not-unreasonable one that since money can 
often be shown in competitive theoretical models to possess neutrality properties that do not 
seem to obtain in reality, replacing the assumption of competition with some other assumed form 
of interaction will yield theories that are closer to reality with respect to their predictions about 
money and prices." In his opinion "[t]he central issue for a theory of nominal price rigidity ... is 
not the nature of the game agents are assumed to be engaged in, but rather the information 
agents are assumed to have about the state of the system at each date." This difference in 
research methods between New Classicals and (New-)Keynesians does not seem to have any 
theoretical reasons. Instead, "[c]leared markets is simply a principle, not verifiable by direct 
observation, which may or may not be useful in constructing successful hypotheses about the 
behavior of these [time] series [of employment and wage rates]" (Lucas and Sargent (1978, p. 
311)). All this means that New Classicals argue that it is impossible to ascertain by mere 
observation whether markets clear or not. Nevertheless, one must make a decision on this issue 
9 
if one wants to build mathematical models. This decision is a methodological one. And New 
Classicals decide in favour of continuously market clearing prices: actual market price behaviour 
is interpreted as clearing markets continuously. It is a methodological principle, not obtainable 
from mere observation. 
New Classicals not only assume that all markets clear continuously, but they also claim 
that the individuals observe all current equilibrium prices. This has some important implications 
for the information the individuals are assumed to have. After all, if all individuals observe 
current equilibrium prices, they can infer the current non-price information on the markets in 
question. Such non-price information will concern the market participants' expectations with 
regard to future prices, etc. In this case information is homogeneous across the individuals in a 
given market: all individuals observe the current equilibrium price and thus obtain all non-price 
information which exists on that market. Individuals may (though need not) obtain all such 
information by merely observing current equilibrium prices. In other words, there is a (potential) 
informational feedback of these prices. A genera! equilibrium which takes account of this 
potential informational feedback from market prices is called a Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
(REE). By contrast, such a feedback does not exist in an equilibrium in which individuals do 
not observe current equilibrium prices, or in which the prices observed are dwequilibrium prices. 
In section 4 we shall discuss the Rational Expectations Equilibrium concept more in detail. 
3.3. THE LUCAS SUPPLY FUNCTION 
As was shown in section 2.3, the Natural Rate Hypothesis holds that there is a level of supply 
and employment at which the rate of change in prices remains constant. It implies that individ-
uals' expectations are correct, which is only possible if their knowledge is correct ('chance hits' 
excluded). In this sense one may distinguish a benchmark-economy in which all variables are at 
their respective natural rates. This economy will emerge when all individuals have perfect 
knowledge and perfect foresight. This benchmark is dynamic in the sense that real variables 
remain at their 'natural' rate as long as all (exogenous and endogenous) changes are perceived 
and their effects are correctly anticipated. For brevity's sake we shall call this benchmark the 
Natural Rate Equilibrium (NRE). The NRE is thus a REE in which individuals have perfect 
knowledge and perfect foresight. 
The NRE seems to be contradicted by the Phillips curve. Not surprisingly, it does not 
exist in reality because the individuals do not have perfect knowledge and perfect forsight. 
Therefore, the NCE must incorporate one or more features which render the explanation of the 
Phillips curve possible. It found this explanation in the difference between expected and actual 
Radner (1989, p. 317). 
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prices (or rates of return). Informational errors cause divergences from the 'natural rate'. This 
may be shown mathematically by what is called the 'Lucas supply function':20 
(0.1) y = z + a(l-fi)(p&-p£) 
in which y = actual aggregated level of real output; 
z = 'natural rate' of output; 
pp- = actual general price level; 
pP = expected general price level; 
a = parameter which indicates the extent to which a deviation of the expected general 
price level from the actual general price level influences the actual level of 
aggregated output; 
fi = parameter which indicates that the higher the volatility of changes in the actual 
general price level, the lower output deviates from its natural rate. 
The Lucas supply function says that the real value of aggregated output depends on the natural 
rate of output and on the difference between actual and expected prices (Sargent (1973, pp. 
442 - 44)). In other words, it states that the NRE is attained if individuals do not make 
expectational errors (that is, if p^ = p2). The deviation of output from its natural rate will be 
smaller if changes in the actual price level are higher (if j8 is higher). This property may be 
attributed to the assumption that if these changes are larger, individuals will be more inclined to 
attribute a larger proportion of a given change in the actual price level on their local market to 
a change in the economy-wide price level. Obviously, the expectations formation process will play 
a large role in this regard. 
3.4. THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
Presumably the most important characteristic of New Classical analysis is the incorporation of 
Muth's (1961) Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH). Muth (1961, p. 315) had advanced the 
hypothesis that expectations are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economie 
theory. Or, as he formulated more exactly, "... expectations of firms (or, more generally, the 
19
 Most New Classicals, notably Lucas (1973, 1975), Sargent and Wallace (1973) and Barro 
(1976), have used the price as the variable about which expectations must be formed. But as 
Barro (1980) has shown, using the real rate of return enables the NCE to incorporate various 
(interest-bearing) assets into its analysis, thereby making its analysis more general. Cf. also 
Lucas and Rapping (1969), McCallum (1978), King (1980). 
20
 See e.g. Lucas and Rapping (1969, p. 21 - 22); Lucas (1972b, p. 93); Sargent (1973 
(1981), p. 163). As Shiller (1978, p. 9) observes, the Lucas supply function is a representation of 
the Phillips Curve if there exists a linear relationship between the measure of aggregated output 
and the unemployment rate. 
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subjective probability distributions of outcomes) tend to be distiibuted, for the same information 
set, about the prediction of the theory (or the 'objective' probability distributions of outcomes)" 
(Muth (1961, p. 316)). He argued that if economie theorists could predict better than the 
economie agents, they must have superior foreknowledge of the predicted outcome. But if they 
have, would not some entrepreneur study economics in order to sell his better predictions? After 
all, it would be rational for optimizing agents to use economie theory if this could lead to 
(higher) profits. By linking economie theory and economie practice, Muth took a modest stand 
for economists with regard to the predictive powers of their theories. However, if one wants (as 
Muth did) to obtain any definite results (predictions), one must specify a 'correct' model of the 
economy. Furthermore, one must make assumptions with regard to the content of the agents' 
predictions. Therefore, Muth (1961, p. 317) used ("[fjor purposes of analysis ...") a 'specific form' 
of the REH in a partial-equilibrium analysis, in which he assumed that the random disturbances 
are normally distributed. New Classicals also use this specific form of the REH, although they 
transpose it to a general-equilibrium context. Obviously, this has some important implication with 
regard to the individuals' information sets. In a partial-equilibrium analysis the hypothesis merely 
means that (in the aggregate) individuals know their local market. By contrast, in a general 
equilibrium framework it implies that the individuals know the economy as a whole. Whereas 
the former implication is rather plausible the latter is not, because nobody can reasonably claim 
to know the correct structure of the economy as a whole. We shall return to this point when 
discussing the informational assumptions. 
Unfortunately the general formulation of the REH leaves room for at least four 
interpretations. A taxonomy may be formulated which discerns a strong and a weak form of the 
REH. The former may be divided into three verslons, namely 1) the descriptive, 2) the micro-
instrumentalist, and 3) the macro-instrumentalist REH. Each of these versions implies some 
assumption with regard to the individuals' information set. This set consists of knowledge 
concerning (i) the 'true' structure of the (model) economy, (ii) the 'true' values of the parame-
ters in that economy, (iii) the values of the relevant variables, and (iv) all exogenous shocks 
which the economy will undergo during the period under consideration. The question to be 
answered in this section is what knowledge the various versions of the REH imply. 
(1) The descriptive version of the strong REH assumes that in reatity individuals use all 
potentially relevant information concerning the structure of the economy, as well as the past and 
In McCloskey's (1985, p. 88) words, "[t]he claim to know how economie actors predict is 
a claim to superior foreknowledge of the predicted outcome. It runs up against the American 
Question, which is always ... an objection to claims of foreknowledge: If you're so smart, why 
ain't you rich?" 
22
 The taxonomy used here is that of Snippe (1986-87), which is compatible with Fischer's 
(1980). 
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current data.23 It argues that this Information is used in such a way that all expectations are in 
fact correct. In this sense it is an assumption about the individual's expectations formation 
process and its outcome. It holds that the individuals possess perfect knowledge with regard to 
the components of the information set given above. However, this will only be rational if 
information is costless. 
(2) The micro-instrumentalist version of the strong form of the REH holds that each individual 
acts as if he has formed correct expectations. It does not say anything about the way in which 
these expectations are formed; it is merely an assumption on the outcome of the individual's 
expectations formation process, not on the process itself. It does not make statements about 
the individuals' information set. 
(3) The macro-instrumentalist version holds that individual expectations (taken separately) may 
be incorrect, but in the aggregate they are correct. In this version expectational errors cancel out, 
presumably due to the 'Law of Large Numbers'. This means that it does not say anything about 
the formation process (and its outcome) of a particular individual's expectations. Therefore the 
macro-instrumentalist version is neither an assumption about this process nor about its outcome. 
Additionally, it does not say anything about the information used by individuals in the expecta-
tions formation process. As Muth (1961, p. 316 - 17) allowed individuals to be subject to greater 
error than the model, implying that their expectational errors would cancel out, his version of 
the REH may best be represented as macro-instrumentalistic. 
Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) have shown that the distinction between the micro- and the 
macro-type versions of the REH is important, because both versions may yield different 
equilibria. Their analysis will be discussed in subsection 4.4.1. 
(4) The weak form of the REH is merely a restatement of the rationality postulate. Individuals 
are assumed to optimize the information on which they base their decisions. However, the 
optimal information need not be sufficiënt to allow for correct (i.e., rational) expectations. 
Therefore it is perfectly consistent with a situation in which information is not costless. At the 
same time, however, it cannot be determined what information is optimal to gather and process, 
and what information is not. Any informational assumption which is combined with the weak 
form of the REH does not follow from the rationality postulate and in that sense is ad hoc. 
Furthermore, the weak form even suffers from an indeterminacy, in the sense that it is 
impossible - to determine the optimal amount of information to be gathered. Information 
optimization presupposes expectations about the marginal return and cost of the information. On 
the other hand, expectations (being informed predictions) presuppose information. In other 
23
 Grossman (1980, p. 10); Snippe (1986-87, p. 428). 
24
 Snippe (1986-87, p. 430). It is hardly conceivable that the outcome of the individual's 
expectations formation process will be correct if it is based on incorrect information. Therefore, 
it seems inevitable to infer that the micro-instrumentalist version implies the same information 
set as does the descriptive version, although the former does not intend to make such claims 
about the process. 
13 
words, expectations are needed in order to optimize information, while information is needed to 
form expectations. This may appear to be a problem of circularity, but it is not. In fact, it is a 
problem of infinite regress because the information needed for expectations formation is of a 
different kind than the information for which the expectations are needed. Thus, optimizing 
information involves infinite regress, leaving the optimality of the information gathered by the 
individuals unexplained and therefore undetermined. 
The REH is not only important because it allows New Classicals to predict, but it also 
has a fundamental implication for econometrie policy evaluation. Lucas (1976) argued that if 
individuals consider information relevant, they will use it in their expectations formation process. 
This also applies to information concerning the govemment's policies. It means that they will 
change their expectations and their actions if the government changes its policies. Model 
simulations in order to determine the effects of such a change in policy should take the 
individuals' reactions into account. In other words, one cannot use models for policy evaluation 
which disregard this change in the individuals' actions. This criticism on policy evaluation is 
called the Lucas critique. 
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The basic New Classical assumptions stress man's rationality, not only as regards his actions but 
also as regards his formation of expectations. Unfortunately expectations cannot be observed, 
neither can the information upon which they are based. Ideally, one would want to express them 
in terms of observable variables. At the same time, one must specify an expectations formation 
process. As was shown, New Classicals use such a process, namely the REH. However, in order 
to determine which form or version they have used, we must look at the informational 
assumptions used in New Classical analysis. And this analysis starts in the Rational Expectations 
Equilibrium. 
4. THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIUM 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the New Classical benchmark-world individuals have perfect knowledge and perfect foresight. 
This means that the economy will always be in its Natural Rate Equilibrium. The individuals 
then do not make expectational errors and all plans will come true. Obviously this is not a very 
realistic situation. Moreover, it does not allow for an explanation of such phenomena as business 
cycles. In order to render such an explanation possible New Classicals must specify which 
assumptions underlying the NRE are not fulfilled. In actual fact, they relax the assumption of 
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perfect knowledge and perfect foresight. However, such a relaxation does not suffice. The 
individuals' information set includes information on (1) the structure of the true model, (2) the 
parameters of that model, and (3) the past and/or current values of the relevant variables. The 
question is which part of the information set the New Classicals assume incomplete. 
New Classical analysis is a general equilibrium analysis in the sense that in principle 
all markets clear. Taking account of the potential informational feedback from market (equilib-
rium) prices leads us to the concept of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). Despite its 
description in section 3.2. it remains a rather vague concept, as its content depends very much 
on its informational assumptions. Lucas (1988) has provided a description of the concept in 
game-theoretic terms, which will be considered in section 4.2. However, this explanation does 
not suffice as New Classical business cycle theorists do not engage in game-theoretical analysis. 
We must take a closer look at the way in which incomplete information is built into New 
Classical models. Incomplete information implies uncertainty, but that notion is rather ambigu-
ous. Therefore a study of several types of 'uncertainty' is made in section 43. Some of these 
types are neglected by New Classicals, which will prove to have some consequences for New 
Classical analysis (section 4.4). Finally, the New Classical way of incorporating the assumptions 
of incomplete information in their models is given (section 4.5). 
4.2. A GAME-THEORETICAL APPROXIMATION OF THE REE 
In the REE expectations need not be identical to actual outcomes, because individuals do not 
possess complete information. As a matter of fact, the equilibrium concept even allows for sharp 
fluctuations in the individuals' actions and for large differences between expectations and 
outcomes. This has resulted in some confusion as to what is equilibrated in the REE. It seems 
to be a rather vague concept. 
Lucas (1988, pp. 15 - 16) has tried to make the concept of the REE intelligible by 
presenting it in game-theoretic terms. He defined it as a (Nash) equilibrium, which "... does not 
refer to a system 'at rest', nor does it necessarily mean 'competitive' equilibrium in the sense of 
price taking agents, nor does it have in general any connection with social optimality properties 
of any kind. All it does mean is that, in the modeL the objectives of each agent and the 
situation he faces are made explicit, that each agent is doing the best he can in light of the 
actions taken by others, and that these actions taken together are technologically feasible." 
However, Lucas's attempt to provide his macroeconomics with a game-theoretic microfounda-
tion does not suffice, because he does not explicate the information the individuals are presumed 
to have. As Kreps (1989, p. 174) has argued, "[i]n a Nash equilibrium, it is (essentially) 
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presumed that players are all aware of the strategies their opponents are selecting."25 This is 
necessary because otherwise individuals would be unable to choose their optimal strategy in the 
light of the actions of the other individuals. In addition Kreps (1989, p. 176, my italics) argues 
that "[i]n a Nash equilibrium, the players are presumed to select their strategies independentfy of 
one another." This independency of individual choices is needed in order to avoid infinite 
regresses in strategie deliberations.26 Furthermore, individuals will only engage in transactions if 
they think that their goals may be achieved. This means that (given their knowledge about their 
opponents' actions and goals) the individuals' choices must be mutually consistent, in the sense 
that all goals can be attained simultaneously. In other words, all goals attained are 'interper-
sonally consistent'. This raises some questions, which will be addressed later. 
As the other New Classicals do not engage in game-theoretic analyses, Lucas's 
exposition does not seem to shed any light on New Classical practice. It does not seem to give a 
correct account of the microeconomic framework they use in modelling economies. What is 
needed is a description of the New Classical modelling strategies. 
However, first we must deal with another problem. Imperfect knowledge and imperfect 
foresight imply uncertainty. Unfortunately, the concept of 'uncertainty' is ambiguous. It is, 
therefore, necessary to look at some types of uncertainty before describing 'how New Classicals 
really model'. 
4.3. IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE AND IMPERFECT FORESIGHT 
In the literature on uncertainty, one may distinguish several approaches to the concept. We shall 
restrict our analysis to two important ones, namely that of Knight (and more or less of J.M. 
Nash (1950, p. 155) assumed "... that the two individuals [playing the game] are highly 
rational, that each can accurately compare his desires for various things, that they are equal in 
bargaining skill, and that each has full knowledge of the tastes and preferences of the other." In 
order to act optimally in the light of the actions undertaken by others the individual under 
consideration must know these actions (strategies). This seems possible only if he also knows 
their goals, their optimal strategies, and the actual outcome of these strategies. To put it in 
game-theoretic terms, the individual is assumed to know the outcome matrix (and the way in 
which his opponents' strategies are derived). Cf. also Nash (1953, p. 130). 
26
 Such indeterminacy may arise in situations which allow beliefs about beliefs (about 
beliefs, etc.) to play a role in the individuals' decision process. Obviously, this may lead to 
infinite regress. Game theory cuts this regress short by assuming the existence of a solution, that 
is, a Nash equilibrium. However, this implies that individuals must decide independently from 
each other. Nash (1953, pp. 130 - 31) identified four stages in which any game can be divided. 
Firstly, players choose a 'threat strategy', to be used if his demands are incompatible with those 
of his opponent. Secondly, the players inform each other about their threats. Thirdly, they act 
independentfy and without communication. Fourthly, the pay-offs are determined (as is the 
question of whether each player gets what he wants, or whether the threats must be carried 
out). Therefore, Nash assumes independency between actions in the third stage, in which the 
players really (decide how to) act (p. 131). For a more detailed description of problems in game 
theory, see Binmore (1990, especially pp. 78 - 79). 
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Keynes) and that of Pesaran, among others. 
Knight (1921 (1948)) distinguished between risk and uncertainty. He argued that "[t]he 
practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the 
distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori 
or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true, the reason 
being in general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt 
with is in a high degree unique" (p. 233, italics in original). This means that an uncertain future 
is unknowable and unpredictable27, while a risky future situation might be predicted and 
therefore be known to some degree. A phenomenon dominated by uncertainty is unique to a 
high degree. Were it to occur in the future, we could not predict its outcome. Conversely, the 
outcome of a 'risky' phenomenon may be predicted by using the 'true' probability distribution, if 
known. 
New Classical models are stochastic in nature. This means that they attribute probability 
functions to the variables under consideration. As Lucas (1977, pp. 223 - 24) acknowledged, 
these models disregard Knightean uncertainty. They can only study phenomena which are 
characterized by risk, that is, which have sufficiënt characteristics in common to be grouped 
together as instances of a recurrent event. New Classicals also regard expectational errors as 
such similar and recurrent events by attributing probability distributions to them. Of course, this 
approach to expectational errors does not imply that they are zero on average. In the aggregate 
the individuals need not know the correct probability distributions of the data generating process. 
In addition, they may suffer from a lack of data, even if they know these distributions. In either 
case the aggregate of individuals will make expectational errors. However, in the REE these 
errors are presumed not to be systematic, that is, they are serially uncorrelated. The reason is 
that such systemacy is seen as easily detectable and correctable. 
A second distinction between types of uncertainty is that of Pesaran (1989, p. 12). He 
distinguishes between what he calls exogenous uncertainty and endogenous or behavioural 
uncertainty. It should be noted that Pesaran's use of the word 'uncertainty' encompasses both 
Knightean 'risk' and 'uncertainty'. Pesaran argues that they may both be caused by endogenous 
(behavioural) or exogenous causes. Endogenous uncertainty exists if the actions of the individual 
in question set adaptative and reactive processes on the part of the other individuals in motion, 
Of course, this does not mean that an uncertain future is unimaginable. 
28
 Note, as Knight himself already did, that it is possible for uncertainty to become risk. 
This will be the case when over time sufficiënt instances of the phenomenon under consideration 
have occurred to enable an individual to draw up a probability distribution. 
Lucas (1977, p. 224) even argues that "[i]n cases of uncertainty, economie reasoning will 
be of no value." This means that "... the analysis will be restricted to the situation in which the 
relevant distributions have settled down to stationary values and can thus be 'known' by traders" 
(Lucas (1975, p. 1121). This view may be attributed to Lucas's view on prediction being the goal 
for economics. Cf. Lucas (1980, pp. 271 - 72, 288), Van Zijp (1990). 
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that is, if the individuals' actions are interdependent. For instance, the outcome of a game of 
chess is endogenously uncertain, because the opponent's actions will depend on the actions of 
the individual under consideration. In contrast, such interdependency between the actions of an 
individual and the uncertainty of their outcome does not exist in case of exogenous uncertainty. 
If we combine the two distinctions we get a taxonomy which entails endogenous risk, 
endogenous uncertainty, exogenous risk and exogenous uncertainty. As New Classicals disregard 
Knightean uncertainty, we shall concentrate on exogenous risk and endogenous (or behaviourat) 
risk. In the latter case the probability of the occurrence of a given event depends on the actions 
of the individual under consideration. This type of risk (in the Knightean sense) arises when 
individuals adapt and react to one another. Conversely, exogenous risk is caused by exogenous 
disturbances, independent from the individual's behaviour. 
4.4. SOLUTIONS TO THE 'COURNOT PROBLEM' 
One of the severest problems in building economie models was already discerned by August 
Cournot (1838 (1927), p. 127). He stated that "... in reality the economie system is a whole of 
which all the parts are connected and react on each other. ... It seems, therefore, as if, for a 
complete and rigorous solution of the problems relative to some parts of the economie system, it 
were indispensable to take the entire system into consideration. But this would surpass the 
powers of mathematical analysis and of our practical methods of calculation, even if the values 
of all the constants could be assigned to them numerically." There are too many individuals and 
too many goods to be handled by direct modelling. The economy is too complex to be fully 
described. Therefore, economists have sought to build models which abstract from reality. This 
problem of modelling the behaviour of all individuals and their interrelations is called the 
Cournot problem (Hoover (1988, pp. 135, 220)). 
New Classicals acknowledge the existence of the Cournot problem. In their view (as in 
Cournot's) partial equilibrium analysis is not a legitimate way of analyzing problems because it 
neglects the interrelations between all parts and markets of an economy. This leads them to 
choose general equilibrium analysis (Hoover (1988, p. 222) ?° New Classicals must also provide a 
solution to the Cournot problem as they want to provide macroeconomics with microfoundations. 
However, according to Hoover (1988, p. 242) they do not solve the problem at all. In fact, one 
may discern two ways in which they circumvent the problem, namely the 'representative-
individual approach' and the 'islands-model approach'. 
Cf. also Lucas (1977, 1980). 
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4.4.1. The representative-individual approach 
Some New Classicals, for instance Sargent (1978, 1987) and Hansen and Sargent (1980), have 
used the concept of the representative individual. This concept is a hypostatisation in the sense 
that it treats aggregates and index numbers as if they obey the principles of microeconomics. By 
introducing the concept New Classicals implicitly assume that all individuals belonging to the 
same 'class' have the same preferences, technology, knowledge, etc. The representative individual 
is defined implicitly as the mathematical mean of the group (subsystem) as a whole. This means 
that it does not allow the analysis of distributional effects, so that the NCE can only analyze 
aggregate income effects. New Classicals concentrate on the magnitude of aggregates, disregard-
ing their composition and its changes. Of course the Cournot problem must be solved by 
abstracting from less relevant features of an economy. The New Classical solution implies that 
redistributions between economie agents fall outside the scope of this type of analysis. However, 
one may wonder whether such redistributions do not have important effects. One may therefore 
query this New Classical abstraction. 
An important consequence of introducing the concept of the representative individual 
is that it does not allow an unambiguous distinction between the micro and macro versions of 
the strong form of the REH. The representative individual by definition forms rational 
expectations which equal (the mean of) the aggregate expectations. This means that the micro 
version of the strong form of the REH must be identical to the macro version. New Classicals 
explain this property by arguing that the expectational deviations will cancel out. However, this 
need not be the case. According to Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989, p. 619), New Classicals 
(and their commentators) believe "... that if expectations are rational in the aggregate, then 
expectational deviations across agents will tend to cancel out" (presumably because of the Law of 
Large Numbers). But in Haltiwanger and Waldman's opinion this will only hold under very 
special circumstances which concern the nature and intensity of the interrelations between the 
actions of the individuals. In their analysis they do not presuppose a representative individual 
and they leave room for differences between individuals. Moreover, the individuals' actions will 
influence those of others. These influences are called congestion (if the influence is negative, in 
the sense that the incentive for agent i to engage in an activity will be lower if the number of 
participants is higher) or synergism (if the influence if positive, in the sense that the incentive 
The concept of the representative entity was first used by Marshall (1890 (1947), pp. 317 
- 18, italics in original) who used the 'average firm', although not in a mathematical sense. In 
his view, "... a Representative firm is that particular average sort of firm, at which we need to 
look in order to see how far the economies, internal and extemal, of production on a large scale 
have extended generally in the industry and country in question." It is not a fictituous entity as 
"... we can see it fairly well by selectmg, after a broad survey, a firm ... (or better still, more 
than one), that represents, to the best of our judgment, this particular average." 
Cf. Hoover (1988) and Pesaran (1989). 
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will be higher).33 Haltiwanger and Waldman model agent i's costs and benefits of partidpating 
in an activity as a function of the number of partidpants. In case of congestion the benefit of 
partidpating declines when the number of partidpants rises; in case of synergism the opposite 
applies. By incorporating these costs and benefits into their analysis, they model the interdepen-
dence between individuals' actions and hence the interactional effects. Their analysis comes to 
the conclusion that "[o]nly under very spedal conditions do Standard [i.e. micro-type] rational 
expectations and aggregate rational expectations yield equivalent results" (1989, p. 631). It turns 
out that "[t]he size of the difference [between the two equilibria] will be larger (i) the larger is 
the divergence in expectations under aggregate rational expectations, and (ii) the more 
synergistic is the environment" (p. 631). They condude that it is not permitted to assume that 
the expectational deviations cancel out. New Classicals implidtly make this assumption by 
introducing the concept of the representative individual. 
Another reason why expectational deviations may not cancel out concerns (1) the 
individuals' abilities to gather and process information, and/or (2) their forecast functions.34 
Some individuals may not be able to gather and process information as effidently as others, or 
(given their information) they may not be able to predict as accurately as others. Their 
expectational errors will then be larger than those of others. Moreover, there seems to be no 
reason why these errors should cancel out. The New Classical models under consideration do 
not allow individuals to have such different abilities and/or functions, because their analysis does 
not consider the micro level. They cannot discriminate between individual and aggregate 
expectations and behaviour. Therefore their models are unsuited for analyzing divergent 
expectations. They merely allow for statements concerning the expectational errors on aggregate. 
This means that those New Classicals who follow Sargent's (1978, 1987) and Hansen and 
Sargent's (1980) strategy of using the concept of the representative individual, must abandon 
their claim to have provided macroeconomics with microfoundations. As Klausinger (1989a, p. 
182; 1989b, pp. 9 - 10) correctly observes, methodological individualism requires the specification 
of (1) individual optimizing behaviour, and (2) an interaction mechanism. After all, the economie 
system as a whole consists of the individuals and their interrelations (interactions). New 
Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989, p. 620) depict these incentives as follows: "[a] crudal 
factor in determining the relationship between Standard [micro] and aggregate [macro] rational 
expectations equilibria is the nature of the interactions among agents. This interaction is 
characterized as being either of two types. First, activities can exhibit congestion, i.e., the larger 
is the total number of agents who choose to partidpate in a given activity, the lower is the 
incentive for agent i to choose that activity. ... Second, the activities can exhibit synergism, i.e., 
the larger is the total number of agents who choose to partidpate in a given activity, the higher 
is the incentive for agent i to choose that activity." For instance, the problem of career choice 
involves congestion, as does the problem of choosing between different roads which lead to the 
same final destination. On the other hand, using a particular currency in international trade 
exhibits synergism because it will be more profitable for a particular trader if more traders 
accept it. 
Cf. Runde and Torr (1985, p. 220) and Bray (1985, p. 168). 
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Classicals disregard the interrelations by equating the system as a whole with the individuals' 
behaviour. Therefore they have not provided macroeconomics with microfoundations in the usual 
sense of this term. It does not even give an account of 'real individual' behaviour, as the 
representative individual is merely another way of depicting the system as a whole. The 
importance of this point was also stressed by Runde and Torr (1985, p. 217), who argued that 
the rational expectations approach (that is, the NCE) does not analyze individual, but rather the 
market's behaviour (Runde and Torr (1985, p. 217)). 
4.4.2. The islands-model approach 
A second, apparently more sophisticated, way in which New Classicals circumvented the problem 
of Cournot is to model markets as islands, as Phelps (1970) did.35 In the 'islands' models a 
single good is traded on several markets which are "imperfectly linked both physically and 
informationally" (Lucas (1975, p. 1114). Information is thus assumed to be homogeneous across 
individuals in a given market, but heterogeneous across markets. The 'islands' parabel implies 
that in a given market an individual's output decisions are perfectly known by the other market 
participants. It means that there is no endogenous risk: the individual in question knows what 
the other participants on his market will do, and their decisions will not disturb the fulfilment of 
his plans.36 
Another way of expressing the fact that New Classicals merely analyze exogenous risk 
is to say that they neglect the coordination problem?1 This means that they neglect the heteroge-
neity of the individuals' plans and knowledge. In reality these plans may not be mutually 
compatible, in the sense that the realization of one plan prevents the realization of another (i.e. 
the plans are interpersonalfy inconsistent). This inconsistency may give rise to disappointments, 
learning processes and changing (and adapting) behaviour. The latter will change the social 
environment of all other individuals, whose expectations will not come true anymore. The 
interpersonal inconsistency of plans causes endogenous uncertainty. It may lead to a possible 
instability of the 'true' model. Lucas (1977 (1981), p. 223) defends this neglect by arguing that in 
order "[t]o practise economics, we need some way (...) of understanding which decision problem 
Instances of this approach in New Classical Economics are Lucas (1972a, 1973, 1975), 
Barro (1976, 1980, 1981b) and Townshend (1983). 
36
 In the 'islands' models there cannot be endogenous risk caused by individuals who 
operate on different local markets as these markets are "imperfectly linked both physically and 
informationally". This means that (by definition) there is no trade between markets, and that 
output decisions on one local market do not influence those on another. 
37
 The coordination problem exists if individual plans are inconsistent in the sense that 
some of these plans cannot be fulfilled without frustrating the fulfilment of other individuals' 
plans. The latter individuals will be faced with unexpected outcomes of their actions. Their 
expectations will prove wrong, leading them to adjust their actions. However, this adjustment will 
cause other individuals to make expectational errors. In other words, the coordination problem 
implies that it is by no means certain that the economy will eventually converge to the NRE. 
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agents are solving." Therefore he assumes the strong fonn of the REH. However, as Buiter 
(1980) noted, as a corollary New Classicals do not model individual behaviour as a 'game 
between optimizing players' but as a 'game against nature', that is, against an unchanging social 
environment. Taking interpersonal inconsistency of plans into account will influence New 
Classical analysis to a great extent because "[o]nce we cease to model private agents as playing a 
game against nature - the competitive market - Standard optimization techniques are no longer 
applicable within the private sector" (Buiter (1980, p. 46), italics in origmal). Modelling individual 
behaviour as a game between optimizing players means that it becomes less likely (or more 
hnprobable) that learning will lead to the attainment of the REE, because the 'true' structure of 
the economy continuously changes. The New Classical argument that systematic expectational 
errors are easily detectable and correctable then does not suffice to make the strong form of the 
REH plausible. McCallum (1980b, p. 718) and Hahn (1986, p. 281) pointed out that in a 
changing environment individuals may continue to make (other) systematic errors. According to 
the former, "... the existence of some detectable departure from pure randomness in past errors 
does not provide any good reason from believing that the same departure - or any other 
particular departure - will occur in the future." This may even lead to the situation in which 
individuals use different models (Machlup (1983)). Then there is no reason why these expecta-
tions will continue to come true (Hahn (1980)). The heterogeneity of information may thus 
concern the structure of the economy. 
According to Pesaran (1989, p. 57), New Classicals solve the problem of heterogeneity 
across markets. He says that they make two assumptions. Firstly, "[a]ll firms [or individuals] 
observe current equilibrium prices in their local markets." Prices clear all markets, thus 
conveying all information on that market. By observing the current price on their market, 
individuals obtain all knowledge on that market. This ensures the homogeneity of information 
across individuals in a given market. As was shown above, this means that there is no endoge-
nous risk. However, in the REE the Strong form of the REH must also apply. This leads to the 
second assumption, namely that "[a]ll firms [or individuals] know the true distribution of the 
disparity between the equilibrium prices in the local markets and the economy-wide average 
current equilibrium price level." The assumption implies that on the average individuals form 
correct expectations (in a probabilistic sense) concerning the economy-wide average price level. 
This seems possible only if they know the prices on all other local markets, which will give them 
the same information as the individuals on those markets. Thus, for the strong REH to apply, it 
38
 However, he acknowledges that the REH "... will not be of value in understanding 
psychotic behavior. Neither will it be applicable in situations in which one cannot guess which, if 
any, observable frequencies are relevant: situations which Knight called 'uncertainty'." (Lucas 
(1977 (1981), p. 223). 
39
 New Classicals justify the REH by stating that the individuals know the relevant 
stationary distributions (Lucas (1975, p. 1121). By fonning their expectations according to the 
REH, individuals know the rationa! expectations equilibrium ('correct') forecast function. 
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must be assumed that information across markets is homogeneous. The problem of the 
heterogeneity of information across markets in the 'islands' models is circumvented by assuming 
it away. As Frydman (1983, p. 115) concluded, "the assumption that agents form rational 
expectations appears to conflict with the fact that the economy is decentralized." 
4.4.3. Conclusions 
The REE implies that there are no endogenous reasons for expectational errors, that is, there is 
no endogenous risk. The coordination problem is assumed away. However, this does not mean 
that there is no risk at all. lts source may be an exogenous one. New Classicals argue that 
business cycles are indeed caused by such exogenous risk, as will be shown in section 5. 
However, before addressing this issue we must first complete our analysis of the REE. The 
question which must still be answered is whether individuals may learn in such a way as to bring 
about a REE. In other words, is convergence towards the REE possible or perhaps even 
plausible? 
4.5. CONVERGENCE TOWARDS THE REE AND THE STRONG REH 
New Classicals have tried to analyze whether the strong form of the REH is a plausible 
expectations formation process. They have studied the circumstances under which individuals will 
learn to form expectations 'rationally' (i.e. correctly).40 Or to put it more correctly, they have 
analyzed whether individuals who do not form their expectations rationally, will learn in such a 
way with regard to their expectations formation process as to change this process in the 
direction of the strong form of the REH.41 The results of the studies are rather ambiguous. As 
Blume, Bray and Easley (1982) have shown, two approaches exist in economie literature, the one 
yielding convergence to rational expectations and the other concluding that the formation process 
of rational expectations may not be stable because of agents having incorrectly specified 
likelihood functions. In the latter case the stability of the formation process depends (among 
others) on the specifie learning process.43 For instance, Bray (1982, pp. 329 - 30) suggests that a 
learning procedure may eventually lead to rational expectations, albeit under very stringent 
conditions (such as correct knowledge concerning the data generating process, i.e., the true 
4U
 Cf. Shiller (1978), DeCanio (1979), Blume, Bray and Easley (1982), Bray (1982), and 
Frydman (1982), among others. McCallum (1983, p. 139), on the other hand, argues that the 
convergence problem is a problem which "... is not properly attributable to the rationality 
hypothesis but, instead, is a general feature of dynamic models involving expectations." 
41
 Pesaran (1989, Ch. 3) discusses several types of learning models. 
42
 Blume, Bray and Easley (1982) use the term 'rational expectations' in the sense of 
'correct expectations'. In other words, they hold the term to mean a strong form of the REH. 
Cf. DeCanio (1979), Blume and Easley (1982) and Bray (1982). 
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structure of the economy). She concludes that rationa! expectations and the NRE are at best 
long-run phenomena. Other economists disagree with this. Shiller (1978) holds that even if we 
assume that in the future agents know the correct model and behave accordingly, there is no 
guarantee that the individuals today will behave according to it. Moreover, as there may be a 
variety of future REEs (i.e., the future equilibrium economy may be organized in several 
different ways), individuals must determine which equilibrium will come about. According to 
Shiller (1978) we cannot know which of the possible REEs they will choose. It means that we 
cannot know which path the economy will follow. The choice of REE by the economie model-
builder will then depend on ad-hoc assumptions with regard to "initial expectations mechanisms 
and the way people revise these mechanisms" (Shiller (1978, p. 38)). It might be added that in 
the case of initial non-Rational Expectations formation processes there is no need for people to 
use identical expectations formation mechanisms, nor to revise them in an identical manner. This 
means that any convergence of the individuals' expectations formation process towards Rational 
Expectations hinges on ad-hoc assumptions with regard to the initial leaming funcüons of the 
individuals. 
4.6. CRITICISMS OF NEW CLASSICAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
The assumptions underlying the New Classical analysis have been extensively criticized. These 
criticisms are directed at the New Classical model per se and at the knowledge the individuals 
must possess in order to be able to form rational expectations. 
B. Friedman (1979) and DeCanio (1979) argued that the model described by the NCE 
need not be the correct one. The economy may also be described by other (non-market 
clearing) models. In other words, there may be more 'correct' models. New Classicals have 
agreed with this criticism, but as Sargent (1976) has shown, it is not as devastating as the critics 
argued. He showed that the reduced form of New Classical models may also be derived from 
models which exhibit price rigidity. This phenomenon is called observational equivalence. The 
choice of model is then 'merel/ a methodological matter. The New Classicals choose to adhere 
to general equilibrium analysis. 
Secondly, suppose that the New Classical model is correct and that the agents perceive 
it correctly. Then one might object that the computational exercises required to form rational 
expectations are too difficult to be carried out by individuals. Begg (1982, p. 62 - 63) argues that 
not every individual needs to form expectations. Some spend a lot of effort in predicting and in 
publishing these predictions (like governments and profit-motivated firms) and others may simply 
adopt these expectations. However, they will often be different, which makes it necessary for 
individuals to choose between them. Such choices will only lead to rational expectations if and 
only if individuals are capable of deciding which alternative predictions are closer to the 'truth'. 
This means that they must know the correct predictions. However, rational expectations may still 
be saved by referring to the billiard player, who does not need to perform difficult mathematical 
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calculations in order to make a 'cannon' (this leads to a so-called as if version of the REH; cf. 
Snippe (1986 - 87)). 
Thirdly, Burmeister (1980) argues that New Classical models are confronted with so-
called non-uniqueness problems. This means that the rational expectations equilibrium path may 
prove to be 'too stable', in the sense that any disturbance may give rise to several convergent 
paths. The adjustment path is non-unique. As a result the model is then incapable of describing 
this path. In Burmeister's view, the occurrence of a 'Saddlepoint', that is, a unique convergence 
path, is too unlikely to render New Classical models practically useful. Begg (1982, p. 64) rejects 
this criticism by claiming that "... a wide range of models do generate the Saddlepoint property." 
This unresolved issue has been extensively discussed by Shiller (1978), Fischer (1988), Diamond 
and Fudenberg (1989), Pesaran (1989) and McCallum (1989a). As opinions continue to differ in 
this respect, the conclusion must be that the issue remains unresolved. 
Fourthly, New Classical models imply that the individuals know the correct model and 
the relevant distributions of the variables. However, the acquisition of such information will not 
be rational if information costs exist. As Darby (1976) has shown, costly information may explain 
systematic errors in expectations in markets, even if individuals know the correct model. 
Moreover, if arbitrage is too costly, differences in systematic errors may occur between markets. 
New Classicals would not deny this. As a matter of fact, they even argue that expectational 
errors, due to a lack of information, cause business cycles. However, they continue to assume 
that individuals know the correct model. The lack of information merely concerns knowledge 
about the current values of some economy-wide variables. 
4.7. CONCLUSIONS 
New Classicals assume in one way or another that information is homogeneous across markets. 
At least this assumption is rather stringent. It seems in flagrant contradiction with everyday 
practice in decentralized market economies, because uncertainty in New Classical analysis is 
merely of the type of exogenous risk. This means that individuals do not react upon the actions 
of other individuals. Stated differently, the NCE does not solve the so-called coordination 
problem. This contradicts the New Classical methodologjcal-individualist claim of having provided 
macroeconomics with microfoundations. Methodological individualism argues that one should 
specify (1) the behaviour of all individuals, and (2) the (interaction) mechanism which coordina-
tes their actions. As the strong form of the REH assumes away the latter, it seems appropriate 
to conclude that New Classical Economies must either abandon the strong form of the REH or 
give up its claim to have provided macroeconomics with microfoundations. 
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5. THE EXPLANATTON OF BUSINESS CYCLES 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Leijonhufvud (1984, p. 187) created a taxonomy which defines four types of business cycle 
theories. These types are identified in terms of (1) the nature of the cause of the cycle, and (2) 
the nature of the phenomena which constitute it. He considered these natures either 'real' (R) 
or 'nominal' (N). This approach leads to the following taxonomy of business cycles: N/N, N/R, 
R/N, and R/R. As will become clear, the New Classical theory is a N/R theory: the cause of 
the cycle is a monetary (i.e. nominal) one; whereas the phenomena constituting the cycle are 
real in nature. The exogenous disturbance causing the cycle is a (random) increase in the rate of 
monetary expansion, whereas the real phenomena constituting the cycle are overinvestments. 
Therefore, the New Classical monetary business cycle theory is also called a monetary overinvest-
ment theory. 
5.2. MONETARY SHOCKS AND THE INTERPRETATION PROBLEM 
New Classical monetary business cycle models are 'islands' models, in which each individual can 
only operate in one (local) market, and in which one good is produced. As this good is a non-
durable, some store of value must be presupposed. New Classicals introducé fiat money. They 
also assume that trade can only take place by using this money.46 In addition, the money supply 
fluctuates randomly, which is caused by governmental spending. These random shocks are evenly 
spread throughout the economy, in the sense that the deviations of the monetary shocks in the 
local market from the economy-wide average shock are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Money is then evenly distributed across all markets. Furthermore, the distribution of the 
deviations is assumed to be constant and known by individuals (cf. Lucas (1975, p. 1122)). And 
finally, at the end of each trading period individuals select randomly a new market. This latter 
The term 'nominal', however, seems to be somewhat misleading; 'monetary' seems to 
express Leijonhufvud's intention more clearly; cf. also Garrison (1989, p. 5). 
45
 During the 1980s, some New Classicals have also developed business cycle models in 
which both the causes and the constituting phenomena are real in nature. For a comprehensive 
overview, see McCallum (1989b). 
46
 Cf. Lucas (1972, p. 68). 
47
 This means that the distribution of additional money across markets will not cause prices 
to vary between them. 
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property of the islands model is also assumed to be known among individuals.48 
Given complete information on the values of the relevant variables, individuals know 
that the increase in their money balances is due to an economy-wide monetary shock.49 
However, in New Classical business cycle models they do not have such complete information. 
In fact, their information sets have a one-period lag with regard to the current values of 
economy-wide variables. The economy-wide monetary shock then unexpectedly raises the 
individuals' money balances. It will change the nominal price level (i.e., the average rate of 
exchange between money and goods) via a real cash-balances effect (cf. Lucas (1972, p. 66)). 
This implies that local prices will change. Individuals are then faced with an interpretation 
problem, namely whether the price movements are caused by relative demand shifts or by 
economy-wide monetary changes. Unaware of the additional increase in the money stock, they 
are bound to underestimate the nominal component of the rise in prices and will increase their 
production. In other words, in the short run (i.e., in the period in which the monetary disturb-
ance takes place) a purely monetary change will lead to a change in real variables. This 
relationship can be represented by a Phillips curve. However, as soon as new information with 
regard to the general price level becomes available, the individuals will discover that they have 
interpreted the price increases wrongly. They will then adjust their production to the 'natural 
rate' level, thereby restoring the neutrality of money in the longer run. This means that (given 
serially «ncorrelated economy-wide monetary disturbances) there will not be any serial correla-
tion in the fluctuations of output. However, a business cycle is characterized by the fact that the 
consequences of expectational errors are serially correlated. This led many critics to argue that 
New Classicals cannot maintain that a business cycle exists. As Lucas and Sargent (1978, p. 65) 
pointed out, this criticism fails to distinguish between the sources óf disturbances (impulses) and 
the propagation mechanisms (which will make the impulses have lasting effects). A cycle will 
only come about if the shocks are serially correlated, or if propagation mechanisms transmit the 
This assumption ensures that not all shocks are monetary in nature. For instance, 
suppose a given market experiences a rise in demand. If individuals would not select new 
markets (and all other individuals would know this), the rise could only be ascribed either to 
monetary expansion, or to changes in the individuals' preferences. In economics the latter are 
usually taken to be constant. This means that the shocks must be monetary in nature. As the 
monetary expansion is permanent, it is not profitable for individuals to increase their current 
labour input. In the aggregate there would not be any expectational error, hence no business 
cycle. 
49
 For instance, see Sargent and Wallace (1975, p. 221 - 24). 
50
 Neutrality of money means that its level does not influence any steady-state real 
variables. Superneutrality of money means that its growih rate does not influence steady-state real 
variables. For a comprehensive account of the preconditions for neutral money, cf. Aschheim 
and Hsieh (1969, pp. 211 - 15). 
51
 E.g., Hall (1975, pp. 311 - 14). Tobin (1977) and Modigliani (1977) have raised similar 
objections. 
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consequences of the expectational errors to other periods. 
5.3. THE PROPAGATION MECHANISMS 
Several New Classical models incorporate propagation mechanisms. For instance, Lucas's 1975 
model exhibits persistence effects by incorporating physical capital.52 Blinder and Fischer (1981) 
use the gradual adjustment of inventory stocks of finished goods in order to make a basic New 
Classical model produce business cycles. Fischer (1979), among others, introduced capacity 
effects, caused by real-balance effects, in order to show that monetary policy will have persistent 
real effects on the economy. In general, these mechanisms are instances of what Barro (1981b, 
p. 48) calls 'adjustment-cost explanations' for the persistence of the real effects of the shocks. 
He observes that these explanations imply that investment will initially rise sharply after the 
unexpected disturbance, but would thereafter decline gradually. However, this does not 
correspond with empirical evidence, which indicates that investment and output rise during 
several periods before declining. Two explanations may be given for this. Firstly, information lags 
may be longer than one period, that is, they may prevent even the past values of the relevant 
variables from being known (Lucas (1975, p. 1114)). However, this explanation seems to be 
somewhat ad hoc, in the sense that information with regard to aggregated variables usually 
becomes available during the next period. It may not be consistent with the rationality postulate 
for the individuals to disregard this new information. Secondly, Kydland and Prescott (1980, pp. 
175ff) argue that investment projects involve planning. In their model increases in real output 
are lagged because "... there are long lags from the time when changes in its determinants call 
for an increase in the capital stock until the time when the new capital starts yielding services. 
5.4. NEW CLASSICAL VIEWS ON MONETARY POLICY 
The question to be answered now is whether New Classicals envisage any role for monetary 
policy. Not surprisingly, their views on its effectiveness will depend on the assumptions made as 
regards information. Firstly, the effectiveness of monetary policy in the NRÉ will be discussed. In 
this situation monetary policy will prove to be ineffective: it does not influence real variables. 
This position is called the neutrality proposition. Secondly, attention will be paid to more realistic 
In Lucas's model a once-and-for-all increase in the money supply will merely lead to a 
rise in the general price level as soon as the information concerning the monetary shock 
becomes available. Thus, money is neutral in the longer run. However, money will not be 
superneutral: a change in the growth rate of the money supply will not lead to a proportional 
charige in the rate of inflation. This effect operates by changing the real yield on money. For a 
analysis of this effect, cf. Tobin (1965). 
53
 Cf. also Hall (1977). For some criticisms on the Kydland and Prescott paper, cf. Taylor 
(1980). 
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situations in which infonnation is imperfect. Monetary policy will not turn out to be completely 
ineffective, but New Classicals remain sceptical about its use. 
5.4.1. The neutrality proposition 
Sargent and Wallace (1975) have shown that in the NRE monetary policy is neutral in the sense 
that it does not affect real variables. If all individuals have perfect knowledge and perfect 
foresight in a probabilistic sense, they will make expectational errors only at random. In other 
words, if there is certainty equivalence, individuals will not make expectational errors. Obviously, 
the perfect knowledge and perfect foresight presupposed in the NRE must (by definition) also 
concern the government's future policy. Individuals will then know what the government and/or 
the monetary authorities intend to do, which enables them to anticipate the policy measures 
correctly (again in a probabilistic sense). As New Classicals adopt Friedman's quantity theory of 
money, this renders monetary policy ineffective. A monetary expansion will merely raise the 
price level, but leaves real output unaffected. This proposition is called the neutrality proposi-
tion.54 As it merely holds for the NRE, it implies that all preconditions for the existence of the 
benchmark world must be fulfilled. Furthermore, the New Classical models under consideration 
must be linear ones, as non-linearity of the equations also leads to policy-effectiveness (cf. 
Shiller (1978), Snower (1984)). Finally, monetary policy will also be effective in the case of an 
open economy (cf. Montiel (1987)); or if individuals hold different assets (cf. Minford (1986)). 
5.4.2. Nonneutrality: prevention of the cycle 
Not surprisingly, government pohcy will have real effects if the government indeed has 
informational advantages. However, the duration of these effects will depend on the length of 
Most New Classicals would not deny that changes in fiscal policy will have real effects. It 
is hard to deny that a rise in income tax rates will provide individuals with an incentive to 
reduce their labour supply, which obviously is a real effect. On the other hand, Barro (1978) has 
argued that (under certain conditions) the way in which a government finances its expenditures 
does not influence the economy in any real sense. A tax reduction without a reduction in 
expenditures will merely lead to the individuals' expectation that taxes must rise in the future in 
order to pay off the government's increasing debt. They will discount the expected tax rise and 
therefore will not increase their consumption. Rational individuals will not feel better off. This 
position is called the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. It should be noted that the circumstances 
under which it is valid are even less realistic than those of the (monetary) policy-neutrality 
proposition. For instance, it is necessary that taxes are lump-sum, because otherwise the changes 
in policy will have distributional effects. In addition, the individuals must act as if they live 
forever. Furthermore, they must discount the expected tax increase at the correct rate of 
interest. And they must even correctly estimate their future needs (which presumably are more 
often underestimated, due to time preference). 
55
 Shiller (1978, p. 13) concludes that "[i]n practice, the monetary authority will always have 
some form of infonnation advantage, because it has greater resources to evaluate data than do 
many individuals in the economy." On the other hand, this will only be true for economy-wide 
variables. It is more likely that individuals will know more about conditions in their local 
markets than governments and monetary authorities do. Cf. Hayek's (1945) notion of the 
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the informational advantage. If the advantage is temporary, so will the effects be. Governments 
are then incapable of reducing unemployment below its 'natural rate' level forever: they cannot 
even 'fooi some people all the time'. As expectations are formed rationally, the aggregate of the 
individuals will take inflationary policies into account, leading them to expect higher inflation. 
The suppression of unemployment below the NRU then needs a higher rate of monetary 
expansion. However, during the next period the individuals will also take this higher rate into 
account. Therefore, in order to suppress unemployment below the NRU systematic monetary 
policy will only lead to hyperinflation, without unemployment being lowered. However, one might 
argue that although governments do not have an informational advantage in the long run, they 
do possess such an advantage in the short run. As business cycles are short-run phenomena, one 
might argue that they can be combatted by adopting the right policy. The question then is: 
which policy must be selected? This will of course depend on the criterion used. Two criteria 
have been identified in New Classical literature. Firstly, Sargent and Wallace (1975, p. 5) have 
proposed the stabilization of some measure for aggregate output (or, in a growing economy, for 
the rate of growth of aggregate output). Secondly, Barro (1976, pp. 15, 93) has proposed to use 
the gap between actual and full information output as a criterion. Theoretically, the latter 
criterion seems to be more correct than that of Sargent and Wallace. Their steady-growth 
criterion does not take unexpected exogenous disturbances (such as steep increases in oil prices) 
into account, whereas Barro's NRE-criterion does. Furthermore, New Classicals have adopted 
the NRE as their theoretical benchmark, so why not as a policy-benchmark? However, Barro's 
criterion encounters an inherent difficulty: ex ante (and presumably also ex post, as perfect 
knowledge concerning an economie system runs counter to the Cournot problem) we do not 
know the full information output of the present period, so how can we minimize the gap 
mentioned? Sargent and Wallace's criterion therefore seems to be more 'practical'. 
However, even if governments have informational advantages, they need not exploit 
them. They could provide the private sector with the missing information, letting it decide for 
itself how to act.56 Whether this will be more efficiënt than carrying out a monetary policy, 
en 
depends on (1) the costs of transmitting the lacking information, and/or (2) the information 
processing abilities of the private and the public sector respectively. 
'dispersion of knowledge'. 
56
 When interpreted in a public-choice framework, politicians and civil servants will try to 
attain their own personal objectives. Presumably this will lead them to favour monetary policy 
over transferring information. However, as New Classicals do not reduce aggregates to their 
constituting parts (and their mterrelations), they cannot consider this aspect. 
57
 Given modern means of mass communication, these costs will presumably not be 
prohibitive. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FTNAL REMARKS 
New Classical (monetary) business cycle theory is a so-called N/R theory. It identifies an 
unexpected increase in the money supply as the cause of the cycle. By contrast, the phenomena 
constituting the cycle are real in nature. These mainly include overinvestment, either in 
productive capacity or in inventories. Therefore the New Classical theory may best be called a 
monetary overinvestment theory (Lucas (1975, section 12). It presupposes that the individuals 
form their expectations according to some version of the strong REH (or according to the weak 
form, if information gathering and processing is costless). This prevents government policy from 
having any lasting effects. 
New Classical analysis either sidesteps the issue of the coordination problem by making use of 
the concept of a representative individual, or assumes the problem to be nonexistent (by 
assuming information concerning endogenous variables to be homogeneous and correct across 
markets). In both cases there are no microfoundations for New Classical (Macro) Economics. 
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